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AnalysisInternet & Protocols2d ago

The IESG should reject solo ML-KEM for TLS and keep the hybrid safety net

An IETF-wide last call asks the steering group to publish pure ML-KEM key agreement for TLS 1.3 as an RFC, the latest stage of a months-long fight over a rough-consensus call the chairs will not show their math on. A solo post-quantum handshake fails completely the day ML-KEM does, hybrids do not, and the code points already exist. The IESG should reject it. Comments close 13 August.