This is a particularly rich issue of the JSE. And a hefty one. Its size is due primarily to two quite lengthy essays, one by Bryan Williams and one by Michael Sudduth. Of course, all of this issue’s articles and reviews are worth reading; that’s why we’re publishing them. But these two huge essays merit a few extra comments. Bryan Williams has given us something that I and various SSE members have hoped for over the years, a detailed review of (...) a specific line of anomalistic research—the kind of article that would be useful to both veterans and newcomers to edge science. I’ve often tried to recruit such an opus from SSE colleagues at our conferences, hoping my considerable charm would dazzle them into accepting the opportunity. I’ve even been assured on several occasions that the solicited reviews would be forthcoming. But only Bryan, so far, has delivered the goods, a splendid essay surveying research on PK with random number generators. Not surprisingly, this review took Bryan a long time to write, and I want to thank him, not only for the result, but for his tenacity. Michael Sudduth’s essay is a forensic tour de force —an unprecedently detailed critique of the James Leininger case of ostensible reincarnation. That case is both complicated and messy, and it illustrates a general problem with CORT investigations that I’ve dubbed the Problem of Investigative Intricacy. (shrink)

When one sees an opening chapter entitled “From Science to Love” it begs for further reading. After all, for most these are incongruent terms that represent two seemingly opposite sides in a debate, logic, and systematic evaluation vs. emotion. There have been many books written about the convergence of science and spirituality, and one cannot help but notice how some of today’s physicists are sounding more like spiritualists than scientists, but Dr. Portola uses this platform as wake up call for (...) humanity. There is a brief discussion about some well-known enlightened beings in our history, including founders of today’s organized religions, and our progression from animism to polytheism, and eventually monotheism, but Portola astutely points out the role that science played in explaining natural phenomena. Our ancestors could not have imagined these discoveries, and it was science that moved us past idol worship to spiritual independence. The author is well versed in the primary disciplines of research that suggest survival and devotes part of the book to discussions of the nature of consciousness, neuroscience, thought transmission, psychokinesis, near-death experiences, reincarnation, mediumship, and instrumental TransCommunication, but the overall message is clear that science can show us the road but changing the world paradigm starts with individual transformation. In the discussion of the neurosciences and parapsychology it is suggested that perhaps an adjustment to the scientific method is indicated by putting more value on the anecdotal personal experiences that are so prevalent. In his discussion about a paradigm shift Portola suggests that all people, including scientists and mediums, will understand more by first finding themselves through contemplation and reflection. It is only after we open to the subtle layers of consciousness that we can achieve the necessary balance needed to reach our objectives. The suggestion that scientists also need to contemplate and reflect upon the bigger picture seems contrary to the definition of science, but I suspect that Portola is correct. (shrink)

This slender volume is the twentieth member of a series entitled “Toward Ecological Civilization,” organized under the leadership of distinguished process philosopher and process theologian John B. Cobb, Jr. It grew directly from the 10th Whitehead International Conference, held in Claremont, California, in June 2015, and more particularly from a single conference track devoted specifically to various kinds of “extraordinary experiences” that directly challenge the materialist/physicalist worldview which arose in the 17th century and still dominates the contemporary scientific, educational, and (...) cultural mainstream. The central premises of the series as a whole, the 2015 conference, and the present volume are that postmodern civilization faces life-threatening crises rooted in that impoverished physicalist worldview, that we desperately need a more commodious, life-affirming, and ecologically sound alternative to it, and that Whitehead’s metaphysical vision can help take us in the needed direction. Like Stanley Krippner in the book’s brief Foreword, I am strongly sympathetic to these views. (shrink)

In this article, I examine an ostensible case of the reincarnation type previously investigated and analyzed by Jim Tucker, M.D. of the University of Virginia. The case concerns James Leininger, a young boy who beginning around age two in 2000 and for several years thereafter began exhibiting behaviors and making claims that were later believed to resemble the life and death of World War II fighter pilot James Huston, Jr. The James Leininger story is widely regarded as a superior American (...) case of reincarnation. After a two-year investigation of this case, I present my findings and their implications for the evaluation of this case as evidence for reincarnation. The favorable assessment of the case is based on the assumption that there is a sufficiently robust and credible narrative of James Leininger’s experiences, behaviors, and claims. I will argue that the chronology of events which provide the factual scaffolding of this case is neither robust nor credible, especially with respect to what are presumed to be the case’s strongest features. The official narrative is not robust because it excludes salient contextual details related to James’s exposure to ordinary sources of information which plausibly shaped his experience. The narrative is not credible because the presumed facts of the case are based almost exclusively on the testimony of James Leininger’s parents, but their testimony suffers from a variety of significant credibility problems. These two defects – lack of narrative robustness and credibility – also vitiate Jim Tucker’s investigation and presentation. Consequently, his favorable assessment of this case as evidence for reincarnation is unwarranted. (shrink)

What is it, metaphysically, for a universal to be instantiated in a concrete particular? Philosophical controversy has been ongoing since the beginning of philosophy itself. I here contribute a novel account of instantiation developed on the basis of Aristotelian premises. The key stance is that for Aristotle each substance is one, i.e. single. I show that for Aristotle, the oneness of substances is primitively assumed, and, importantly, cannot be derived from composition of parts, not even holistic composition. Parts undermine oneness. (...) It follows that instantiated properties are 'not parts' of substances. However, if not parts of the substances they are in, what are they? Aristotle shows they are 'qualifications' of the substances they are in. Don’t qualifications undermine the singleness of a substance? I show that Aristotle makes sure they do not. The way he does it is new, then and now. Instantiated properties are ‘hybrid’ entities: they sacrifice their own discreteness 'qua' properties, while adopting the discreteness of the metaphysical subject they qualify, i.e. the substance. But then, how can a universal quality recur in many substances, if, when instantiated, it assimilates the discreteness of each of these substances? This is a key Aristotelian stance: 'the quality recurs, not its qualifications'. Qualities are abstracted from their instances in similar objects, e.g. ‘wisdom’ is abstracted from many ‘wise’ people; ‘wisdom’ is individuated bottom-up from its instances, by abstraction. (shrink)

Many contemporary defenders of paternalist interventions favor a version of paternalism focused on how people often choose the wrong means given their own ends. This idea is typically justified by empirical results in psychology and behavioral economics. To the extent that paternalist interventions can then target the promotion of goals that can be said to be our own, such interventions are prima facie less problematic. One version of this argument starts from the idea that it is meaningful to ascribe to (...) us preferences that we would have if were fully rational, informed and in control over our actions. It is argued here, however, that the very body of empirical results that means paternalists typically rely on also undermines this idea as a robust enough notion. A more modest approach to paternalist interventions, on which such policies are understood as enmeshed with welfare-state policies promoting certain primary goods, is then proposed instead. (shrink)

The Ethics of Cryonics In this paper I discuss the ethics of cryopreservation of individuals declared legally dead. I consider various objections to this practice based on concerns about its selfishness, low chances of succeeding, and wastefulness. I also discuss objections against indefinite life extension and immortality.

In the article, the scenario-moulding is evaluated through the linguistic and conceptual accessibility of the future and the moral challenges of doing and allowing harm to the future participants of the practical discourses rooted in the present-centered scenarios. The viability of the scenarios is suggested to be defined by the alienation from the present and past imaginative contexts, as well as by overcoming the projections of humanity exclusiveness through inversible forecasting with the shift from human power to vulnerability as the (...) key issue in scenario-making. The eccentric approach to the future makes it possible to review both intergenerational and intragenerational perspectives of the future through the chronological distance and yet-inexistent subjects’ expectations and needs simulation. Taking to account the impact of the past, present and future otherness implies the three-dimensional assessment model involving metaphorical evaluation of the past-rooted patterns as paradise lost, illusions of the accessible futures as paradise found, and refusal of the futurized present expectations for the yetunknown imaginative future contexts as paradise conceptually postponed. The approach can find its practical application in tailoring and evaluating migration solutions and scenarios. (shrink)

This paper analyses the methodological ideas of Sergei Vsekhsvyatskii’s Studies on Philosophical Issues of Cosmology and Cosmogony. The article examines the background and history of the development of astronomy and cosmology in Ukraine and its gradual transition from a descriptive method to mathematical analysis. The authors have studied the influence of Ukrainian scholars and philosophers on studies in cosmology, astronomy, philosophical issues in cosmology, and computational cosmology. The philosophical understanding of cosmology and cosmogony is always a search for alternative views (...) on generally accepted ideas, not intending to deny the merits of other sciences but to critically analyse the conclusions of the natural sciences, made based on empirical data and mathematical calculations. The contribution to global knowledge by Ukrainian astronomers, astrophysicists, cosmologists, and other scientists who work on questions about the Universe has been studied. It is indicated in which modern research areas the main contributions were made. These contemporary problems of cosmology go beyond the usual field of understanding of the natural sciences, which actualises the possibility of an interdisciplinary dialogue between physicists and philosophers on the problems of cosmology and cosmogony. Using the example of Sergei Vsekhsvyatskii’s works, the authors showed how philosophical analysis can reveal the weaknesses of the methodology and ask key questions to understand the essence of the processes of space. In the 1960s, he investigated the density of space objects to find new ways to solve the cosmogonic processes of the past. However, even today, the density of the Universe raises major questions. Even though science has made a huge leap in half a century, the essence of scientific and philosophical search remains the same. (shrink)

According to Whitehead, nature is disclosed to mind by an ensemble of events characterized by unobservable hidden intrinsic factors and observable extrinsic factors. Mass is not the substratum of dynamics. It implies spatial extension and temporal duration, which are both necessary conditions of observable natural phenomena. Therefore, an instant, deprived of duration, is immeasurable. Whitehead’s claims on mass, space, and time corroborate Verlinde’s alternative conception of quantum gravitation. Within the de Sitter space-time, this conception starts from the competition of the (...) short distance degrees of freedom of the Ryn-Takanayagi tensor with long-distance thermalized excitations. This enables the creation of a baryonic mass and a decrease in de Sitter entropy. The memory effect of the original baryon creation leads to gravitation and the production of extensive thermodynamic entropy. However, the baryon production shrinks, and the dissipating space-time transforms into a space-timeless cold sink with an accompanying strong contracting memory effect. This is equivalent to the alternate motion of a giant Carnot engine, where the heat source and sink energy exchange produce the eternal periodic dynamics of the Universe. This suggests that the Universe did not start from Big Bang but oscillated eternally as a Big Bounce Universe. (shrink)

Hobbes thinks that people who submit to government can not only hope for, but actually experience, something they recognise as a good life. The good life involves the exercise of harmless liberty –activity that the sovereign should not prohibit. The exchange of harmless liberty in the commonwealth for ruthless self-protection in the state of nature is what might be called Hobbes’s peace dividend. It is the liberty of ordinary citizens to buy, sell, choose and practice a trade as a source (...) of income, and the liberty to keep some of the proceeds if the state does not need resources for public protection. (shrink)

This paper provides a critical review of the debate over the philosophical foundations of mixed methods research and examines the notion of philosophical foundations. It distinguishes axiology-oriented from ontology-oriented philosophical foundations. It also identifies three different senses of philosophical foundations of mixed methods research. The weak sense of philosophical foundations (e.g., pragmatism) merely allows the possibility of the integration of both quantitative and qualitative methods/data/designs. The moderate sense of philosophical foundations (e.g., transformativism) provide a good reason to use mixed methods (...) in (at least some) social scientific research. The strong sense of philosophical foundations (e.g., dialectical pluralism) justifies a normative thesis that mixed methods research should be encouraged in (at least some) social scientific research. (shrink)

In this paper I contrast the metaphysical philosophies of Benedict de Spinoza and the ‘sudden enlightenment’ tradition of Chan Buddhism. Spinoza’s expressivist philosophy, in which everything can be conceived via a lineage of finite causes terminating in substance as a metaphysical ground of all things, emphasises the relative sameness of all entities. By contrast, Chan’s philosophy of emptiness, which rests on the dependent co-origination of all entities, renders such comparison fundamentally meaningless. Having no source beyond dependent co-origination to generate a (...) thing’s distinct nature leads to a metaphysics in which, rather than being relatively similar or different, all things are at one and the same time absolutely the same and absolutely distinct. As a result, Spinoza grounds ethics wholly is sameness or similarity, whereas Chan transcends the dichotomy of sameness and difference and offers an environmental ethics grounded simultaneously in absolute sameness and absolute difference. As a result, in Spinoza’s case, the dissimilarity between human beings and the non-human world places limits on our concern for it. In Chan Buddhism, however, insight into the emptiness of all phenomena leads to a concern for all entities in their suchness, regardless of whether they are similar or different to human beings. As such, I argue that Chan is in a better position than Spinoza to develop a robust environmental ethic. (shrink)

In reply to Hominh and Nguyen, I argue that “creolizing” methods in the study and practice of Buddhism should not be opposed to historicist and contextualist modes of investigation and understanding. Rather, historicism and contextualism can and should inform creolizing approaches.

The orthodox definition of hope suffers from an exclusion problem: it is unable to exclude subjects without hope. In fact, the orthodox definition even allows for despair to be falsely classified as hope. This problem suggests two basic desiderata for a successful analysis of hope; it should solve the exclusion problem, and it should have the resources to explain why, in a given situation, a subject does or does not form a hope. Bearing these desiderata in mind, I assess two (...) recent hope-accounts offered by Jack M. C. Kwong and Cheshire Calhoun. I then offer my own view, which is based on the Jamesian notion of a “live possibility”. I suggest that a possibility needs to reach a certain probability-threshold in order to count as live, and according to my account, to hope is to desire the truth of such a live possibility. This view is well equipped to solve the exclusion problem, and it can explain why a subject does or does not hope. (shrink)

It is widely accepted that necessity comes in different varieties, often called ‘kinds’: metaphysical necessity, logical necessity, natural necessity, conceptual necessity, moral necessity, to name but a few – and the same goes for the varieties of possibility. What is usually not fully appreciated, however, is that modal variety is not simply ‘unidimensional’: it does not only involve one main variable – kind, whose values are the particular kinds of necessity. Rather, I argue, it is ‘bidimensional’, involving two distinct variables (...) – domain and strength. In the first part of the paper, I introduce and develop the proposed bidimensional picture of modal variety, defending it against the common, unidimensional one. In the second part, I consider how the main available accounts of necessities and their relations rely, at least to a significant extent, on the latter picture, pointing out important limitations that they face as a result. I also show how, accordingly, alternative accounts based on a clear and systematic distinction between domain and strength would overcome those limitations. I conclude that, beyond the particular bidimensionalist view defended, our understanding of the modal realm may benefit from more direct debate on whether and how it is multidimensional. (shrink)